On paper, Botswana’s take from its diamond operations is among the highest in the world for a mining nation. When combining corporate taxes, royalties, and dividends from its 50% stake in Debswana—plus the government's direct 15% ownership of De Beers Group itself—Botswana pockets roughly generated by Debswana’s operations.
For decades, Botswana was heavily restricted in how much it could market and sell independently. The previous sales agreements gave De Beers immense control over how and where the diamonds were sold.
At the heart of this success story is Debswana, a 50/50 joint venture between the Government of the Republic of Botswana and De Beers. For years, the operational model was straightforward: Debswana mined the stones, and they were funneled into De Beers’ global sightholder system, largely processed in London. On paper, Botswana’s take from its diamond operations
Looking back at the trajectory of the last half-century, it is difficult to classify Botswana's relationship with De Beers as a purely "raw deal." De Beers and Botswana built a partnership that modernized an entire nation, built infrastructure, and funded robust healthcare and education systems.
Consider this: A rough diamond dug in Botswana might be cut in Surat, India, polished in Antwerp, set in New York, and sold to a bride in Tokyo. Of that final retail price (which could be 5x to 10x the rough value), Botswana currently captures only the cost of extraction plus half the rough profit. The previous sales agreements gave De Beers immense
The vast majority of cutting, polishing, and jewelry manufacturing historically took place overseas. Botswana missed out on the lucrative downstream stages of the supply chain that create the most jobs and economic value.
The current deal is a relic of a pre-synthetic, pre-internet monopoly era. In a world where De Beers’ market share has shrunk from 90% to around 30%, Botswana no longer needs a guardian; it needs a logistics partner. Looking back at the trajectory of the last
Botswana is not asking for a tweak; it is asking for a revolution. President Masisi wants the state to leap from a passive mining partner to the apex predator of the value chain. He wants a dramatically increased share of rough stones—up to 50% of Debswana’s production—to be sold to the state directly. Furthermore, he wants those stones sold not to De Beers, but to a burgeoning local cutting, polishing, and jewelry manufacturing industry.